[1354a] Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic. Both alike are concerned with such things as come, more or less, within the general ken of all men and belong to no definite science. Accordingly all men make use, more or less, of both; for to a certain extent all men attempt to discuss statements and to maintain them, to defend themselves and to attack others. Ordinary people do this either at random or through practice and from acquired habit. Both ways being possible, the subject can plainly be handled systematically, for it is possible to inquire the reason why some speakers succeed through practice and others spontaneously; and every one will at once agree that such an inquiry is the function of an art.
[1354a] Retorica este corespondenta Dialecticii. Amandoua vizeaza, in acelasi mod, lucrurile care intra, mai mult sau mai putin, in sfera generala a cunoasterii umane; ele nu apartin niciunei stiinte anume. In consecinta, toti oamenii le intrebuinteaza, mai mult sau mai putin, pe amandoua, pentru ca intr-o anumita masura toti oamenii incearca sa discute anumite teze, sa le sustina, sa le apere si sa atace altele. Oamenii neinstruiti fac asta fie la intamplare, fie prin practica sau din obisnuinta. Amandoua alternativele fiind posibile, subiectul poate fi manevrat sistematic, pentru ca nu este posibil sa investighezi motivul pentru care unii vorbitori au succes gratie practicii, iar altii spontan; toti vor fi de acord ca o astfel de cercetare este functia unei anumite tehnici.
Now, the framers of the current treatises on rhetoric have constructed but a small portion of that art. The modes of persuasion are the only true constituents of the art: everything else is merely accessory. These writers, however, say nothing about enthymemes, which are the substance of rhetorical persuasion, but deal mainly with non-essentials. The arousing of prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions has nothing to do with the essential facts, but is merely a personal appeal to the man who is judging the case. Consequently if the rules for trials which are now laid down some states — especially in well-governed states — were applied everywhere, such people would have nothing to say. All men, no doubt, think that the laws should prescribe such rules, but some, as in the court of Areopagus, give practical effect to their thoughts and forbid talk about non-essentials. This is sound law and custom. It is not right to pervert the judge by moving him to anger or envy or pity — one might as well warp a carpenter’s rule before using it. Again, a litigant has clearly nothing to do but to show that the alleged fact is so or is not so, that it has or has not happened. As to whether a thing is important or unimportant, just or unjust, the judge must surely refuse to take his instructions from the litigants: he must decide for himself all such points as the law-giver has not already defined for him.
In momentul de fata, cei ce lucreaza la tratatele de retorica au elaborat numai o mica parte din aceasta tehnica. Modurile in care se realizeaza persuasiunea sunt singurele constituente autentice ale acestei tehnici: orice altceva reprezinta un simplu accesoriu. Acesti autori nu pomenesc entimemele, care reprezinta substanta persuasiunii retorice, fiind preocupati numai de ceea ce nu este esential. Aparitia prejudecatii, milei, maniei, precum si a emotiilor similare nu are nimic de-a face cu faptele esentiale, fiind doar un apel personal la cel care judeca situatia respectiva. In consecinta, daca regulile pentru cazurile care sunt formulate in anumite state-in special in statele bine guvernate- ar fi aplicate peste tot, atunci acestor persoane nu le-ar mai ramane nimic de zis. Toti oamenii, fara indoiala, considera ca legile ar trebui sa prescrie aceste reguli, insa unii, precum cei din Areopag, confera impact practic gandurilor lor si interzic discutiile despre ceea ce nu este esential. Aceasta este legea puternica si obiceiul. Nu este corect sa corupi judecatorul starnindu-i sentimente de furie, invidie sau mila-cineva poate sa schimbe regula dulgherului inainte de a o folosi. Iarasi, impricinatul nu are altceva de facut decat sa arate daca faptul respectiv este sau nu este asa, daca s-a intamplat sau nu. In ceea ce priveste importanta faptului, justetea sa, judecatorul trebuie sa refuze sa primeasca instructiuni de la cei aflati in litigiu: el trebuie sa decida pentru sine toate acele puncte pe care legiferatorul nu le-a definit inca pentru el.
